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Abstract.   Pain asymbolia is a rare condition caused by 
brain damage, usually in adulthood.  Asymbolics feel 
pain but appear indifferent to it, and indifferent also to 
visual and verbal threats.  How should we make sense 
of this?  Nikola Grahek thinks asymbolics’ pains are 
abnormal, lacking a component that make normal pains 
unpleasant and motivating.  Colin Klein thinks that 
what is abnormal is not asymbolics’ pains, but 
asymbolics: they have a psychological deficit making 
them unresponsive to unpleasant pain.  I argue for a 
third view.  Asymbolic pains are indeed abnormal, but 
they are abnormal because asymbolics are.  I agree with 
Klein that asymbolics are incapable of caring about their 
bodily integrity; but I argue against him that, if this is to 
explain not only their indifference to visual and verbal 
threat, but also their indifference to pain, we need to do 
the following:  (i) take asymbolics’ lack of bodily care 
not as an alternative to, but as an explanation of, their 
pains missing a component; (ii) claim that the missing 
component consists in evaluative content.  Asymbolia, I 
conclude, reveals not only that unpleasant pain is 
composite, but that its “hedomotive” component is 
evaluative. 
 
Consider Norm and Abe.  Norm is normal but Abe has been a pain 
asymbolic since a recent stroke.  When we immerse their hands in scalding 
water, both say they feel pain, but Norm withdraws his hand, grimaces, 
and resents us, whereas Abe leaves his hand immersed, says he doesn’t 
mind, and laughs.  Unlike pain insensitives, Abe appears to feel pain; but 
unlike Norm, he seems indifferent to it. 
What does Abe’s case tell us about pain?  I argue it tells us 
something not only about the relationship among pain, its unpleasantness, 
and its motivational force, but about the much-disputed nature of pain’s 
unpleasant, motivational aspect.  In particular, it corroborates the view 
that unpleasant pain’s hedomotive component (as I call it) is evaluative 
(Author). 
  
I.  Three Views of Asymbolia 
 
The little that philosophers have said about asymbolia typically conforms 
to one of two models.  On the first, Abe’s situation is as if a security 
system detects an intruder but fails to sound the alarm; on the second, it is 
as if the alarm sounds but no one responds (Fox 2012).  The former, 
hedonic story says that Abe’s pain is abnormal, being neither unpleasant 
nor motivational.  Normal pain, it is claimed, is a composite of a neutral 
pain and a hedomotive component that contributes the overall state’s 
unpleasantness and motivational force.  Abe’s pain lacks that component 
(Grahek 2007).  By contrast, the non-hedonic, psychological story says that 
what is abnormal is not Abe’s pain, but Abe.  His pain is just as unpleasant 
as Norm’s but fails to motivate him thanks to a psychological deficit of his:  
an abnormally high tolerance of unpleasantness, for instance, or as Colin 
Klein thinks, an incapacity to care about his body (2012).  On this view, 
understanding asymbolia does not require a composite conception of 
unpleasant pain, since Abe’s is a case not of pain without unpleasantness, 
but of unpleasantness without motivation, and the motivation is missing 
only because of a defect of Abe’s. 
I shall argue that each story has something right, but that neither 
is adequate as it stands.  I agree with the non-hedonic story that one 
difference between Abe and Norm’s cases is psychological.  In particular, I 
think with Klein that Abe’s lacking the capacity to care about his body 
would illuminate bizarre behaviour that the standard hedonic story 
neglects.  But, against Klein, I argue that we leave Abe’s other bizarre 
behaviour—his defective pain reactions—unexplained unless this care-
lack hypothesis is advanced not as an alternative to the idea that his pain is 
missing its hedomotive component, but as an explanation of why it is 
missing that component.  So I also agree with the hedonic story:  a crucial 
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difference between Abe and Norm’s cases is hedonic—hence, I claim, 
phenomenal.  In short, Abe’s pain is abnormal because he is.   
 So my view is both psychological and hedonic.  It is also 
evaluativist.  For I argue that care-lack explains Abe’s pain’s missing 
hedomotive component only given the following: 
 
Evaluativism 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in (i) undergoing a 
somatosensory experience that represents (accurately or 
not) that a part of one’s own body is damaged or under 
threat of damage; and (ii) that experience additionally 
representing the damage or threat as bad. 1 
 
On this view, the phenomenal character distinctive of pain experiences 
consists not in blank sensation or acquaintance with sense-data, but 
possession of the right representational content.  Crucially for present 
purposes, a pain’s inherently hedonic and motivational character (its 
unpleasantness and power to motivate damage-avoidance) consists in a 
layer of evaluative content, in virtue of which it represents states of damage 
as bad.  That is the hedomotive component that I think Abe’s pain lacks.2  
Now, it is not the job of this paper to defend evaluativism; that is a task I 
have begun elsewhere (Author).  My point here is that we cannot realise 
the explanatory potential of the care-lack hypothesis without 
evaluativism.  If evaluativism is defensible, it illuminates asymbolia. 
 Beyond its intrinsic interest, then, and the general significance of 
the idea of bodily care, asymbolia is important for two reasons:  it reveals  
unpleasant pain to be composite and, more surprisingly, it suggests that 
its hedomotive component is evaluative.  I argue for these claims in §§6-7, 
before which I consider three alternative accounts:  one hedonic, two non-
hedonic.  But first we must get clearer about the data and desiderata. 
 
2.  Data and Desiderata 
                                                          
1 See Author, Cutter and Tye 2011, Helm 2002, and §§6-7 below. 
2 Like other necessary a posteriori identity claims (e.g. that visual experiences’ red-feeling 
character is their red-representing content), evaluativists face the objection that the identified 
features dissociate.  For two such charges, see objections 3 and 4 in §7 below. 
 
Erwin Stengel and Marcelo Berthier provide the clearest case studies of 
asymbolia.3  Stengel discovered the condition in 1928, with Paul Schilder, 
and published studies of it until 1940; Berthier analysed another six cases 
in 1988.  Stengel and Berthier’s patients typically had lesions to their 
insular cortex, resulting from strokes or brain tumours in adulthood.4  
Given noxious stimuli, such as pinches, pinpricks, electric shocks, and hot 
and cold water, they responded as follows: 
 
1.  Avoidance and approach.  All of Berthier’s patients 
exhibited a “total lack of withdrawal”, occasionally 
resulting in serious injury outside the laboratory (1988: 
42-43, 46).  Stengel reports that withdrawal was either 
absent or slow and incomplete (1928: 147). 
 
2.  Verbal behaviour.  Berthier’s patients reported no 
unpleasantness (1988: 43, 47).  Some said the stimuli 
didn’t “bother” them or were “nothing” (Pötzl and 
Stengel 1937: 180). 
 
3.  Expressive Behaviour.  Despite the noxious stimuli, 
Berthier reports that none grimaced or winced (1988: 
43).  (Some smiled and laughed.)  
 
4.  Emotional reaction. The patients were cooperative, 
and not anxious or angry about the tests (Berthier et al 
1988: 43; Schilder and Stengel 1928). 
 
These deficits invite the conclusion that asymbolics are pain insensitives, 
incapable of pain.  But I agree with Stengel and Berthier that they are not, 
since asymbolics say they feel pain, even speaking of stimuli hurting them 
and being painful,5 which testimony is the more significant given further 
differences between them and classical insensitives:  (i) they feel and react 
                                                          
3 For their co-authors, see bibliography. 
4 Berthier et al 1988 (41, 47); Schilder and Stengel 1928, 1931. 
5 Schilder and Stengel 1928 (147); Berthier et al 1988 (44); Pötzl and Stengel 1937 (180). 
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to pain normally for many years before becoming asymbolics, (ii) they 
appear to grasp the concept pain, (iii) their peripheral nervous systems are 
intact and functioning, and (iv) their autonomic responses to noxious 
stimuli (e.g. increased heart rate and sweating) are also normal.6  Hence I 
call the listed deficits the pain deficits, since they involve not an absence of 
pain, but a failure to respond to it normally.   
But the pain deficits are only half the story.  Not all asymbolic 
behaviour looks like abnormal responses to pain, for asymbolics also 
exhibit what I call the non-pain deficits:7 
 
5.  Learning.  Stengel and Berthier’s patients appeared 
even worse than pain insensitives at learning which 
circumstances require avoidance behaviour (Berthier et 
al 1988: 41-43; Klein 2012). 
 
6.  Self-harm.  Stengel and Berthier’s patients sometimes 
approached noxious stimuli, for example placing their 
fingers in flames (Schilder and Stengel 1928:  149).  One 
pricked herself and jammed objects into her eyelids 
(Schilder and Stengel 1931: 598).  
 
7.  Visual and auditory threats.  The patients failed to 
respond to visual and auditory stimuli of a salient or 
threatening kind.  When investigators came at them 
with hammers, knives, and needles, they didn’t respond 
fearfully or aversively. One of Hemphill and Stengel’s 
patients was almost run over because, although he 
recognised a noise as the horn of a lorry bearing down 
on him, he failed to respond.8  
 
                                                          
6 See, on (i), Berthier et al 1988 (44); on (ii),  Trigg 1970 (70-72); on (iii), Nagasaki 2003 (214); on 
(iv), Berthier et al 1988 (44). 
7 On whether these might be explained by the pain abnormalities, see §3.  
8 Berthier et al 1988 (42); Schilder and Stengel 1931 (598); Schilder and Stengel 1928 (149); 
Hemphill and Stengel 1940 (256-57, 259).   
8.  Verbal threats.  The patients didn’t respond to verbal 
threats.  When warned of noxious stimuli, all but one of 
Berthier’s patients did nothing (1988: 42-43).9 
 
Now, the pain and non-pain deficits are surely not a motley.  They exhibit 
a consilience, which Stengel characterises as a failure to appreciate “any 
threats in general” (Schilder and Stengel 1928).  Hence I shall count it a 
virtue of an explanation of asymbolia that it speaks to this consilience, and 
that it explains why pain and non-pain deficits tend to co-occur in 
asymbolics.  Accounts that explain, simply and without adhockery, not 
only why asymbolics are unresponsive to pain, but why they are 
unresponsive to visual or verbal threats, for example, are ceteris paribus 
preferable to accounts that don’t.  But explanations must not be too broad.  
It won’t do, for instance, to say asymbolics cannot feel any negative 
emotions, since there is evidence they can.10  I’ll call this challenge, of 
speaking to both the pain and non-pain deficits, without predicting 
deficits that asymbolics lack, the scope challenge.  It plays an important role 
below. 
 I shall also take the following to be worth preserving if possible 
(Author): 
 
PU.  Necessarily, all pains are unpleasant 
 
UM.  Necessarily, unpleasant pains are inherently motivational, 
i.e. such as to defeasibly motivate damage-limitation, 
independently of further desires. 
 
It might seem as though hedonic accounts must reject PU and non-
hedonic accounts UM.  We shall see whether that is so. 
 Finally, a caveat.  Although I shall proceed as though Abe were 
an exemplar of a well attested condition, the condition (if there is one) is 
considerably less well attested than one would wish (Fox 2012).  Detailed 
case studies are old and few, and they report exceptions:  one of Berthier’s 
patients responded to visual threats; one of Stengel’s grimaced.  Moreover, 
                                                          
9  Schilder and Stengel 1928 (154). 
10 Schilder and Stengel 1928; Hemphill and Stengel 1940 (256). 
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while Stengel, Berthier, and I count subjects as asymbolics only if they 
claim to feel pain, other theorists’ require only weaker evidence of pain, 
and yet others don’t require any, either not recognising a distinction 
between pain insensitivity and indifference, or recognising it but using the 
term “asymbolia” for a kind of insensitivity.  It might be, then, that the 
literature categorises multiple conditions as asymbolia.  Given all this, my 
conclusions should be regarded as tentative only, and as having the 
following form:  if there is a condition of which Abe’s case is paradigmatic, 
here is what we should say about it. 
 
3.  Grahek’s Hedonic Account 
 
As an hedonic theorist, Nikola Grahek claims that Abe’s pain is missing its 
hedomotive component.  This requires a composite view of unpleasant 
pain.  My evaluativism is one such view.  Another is Pitcher’s, on which 
the hedomotive component is not an evaluation of represented damage, 
but a desire for the damage-representation to cease: 
  
Desire View 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in (i) undergoing a 
somatosensory experience that represents (accurately or 
not) that a part of one’s own body is damaged, or under 
threat of damage; and (ii) having a non-instrumental 
desire for that experience immediately to cease.  (Pitcher 
1970) 
 
Grahek endorses a third composite view: 
  
Damage View 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in (i) undergoing a 
somatosensory experience that represents (accurately or 
not) “the location, intensity, temporal profile, and 
nature of a harmful stimulus” (Grahek 2007: 2); and (ii) 
that experience additionally representing the stimulus 
as damaging, or threatening damage (2007: 80).11 
 
On this view, pain’s damage-representing content constitutes not the 
neutral but the hedomotive component.  So it is this content that Grahek 
thinks Abe’s pain lacks (2007:  80-83).  But for now these details don’t 
matter.  Whichever composite view the hedonic theorist opts for, the 
question is:  does the idea that Abe’s pain is missing its hedomotive 
component illuminate Abe all by itself? 
 I think not.  For this basic hedonic view, as it stands, fails the 
scope challenge.12  While it explains Abe’s pain deficits, it neglects his non-
pain deficits.  Why does Abe not withdraw from visual or verbal threats, 
for example?  Why is he worse than insensitives at learning how to avoid 
injury?  That his pains are missing their hedomotive component provides 
no answer. 
 At one point, Grahek gestures at a more general thesis:  that 
asymbolics’ lesions disconnect their sensory and limbic systems, making 
them incapable of “attach[ing] appropriate emotional significance to 
painful stimuli” (Grahek 2007: 52).13  If “painful stimuli” is taken as “any 
sensory representation of noxious stimuli”, this might seem to broaden his 
account so as to capture Abe’s visual and auditory deficits.  But whatever 
the view’s other merits, it leaves other non-pain deficits unexplained.  
Why, for example, is Abe unresponsive when told he is to be injured?  
And why is worse than insensitives at learning how to avoid injury?   
 Another reply Grahek gestures at is that only brains capable of 
unpleasant pain will store certain associations.  Perhaps Abe doesn’t 
respond to visual threat, for example, simply because he knows it won’t 
cause unpleasant pain.  But that explanation would work only if people 
                                                          
11 Grahek is hard to interpret and might not endorse precisely this, since he seems to think that 
the neutral pain (and perhaps the hedomotive component) also has non-representational, 
phenomenal qualities (2007: 81, 95-96).  He is certainly a composite theorist, however, which 
makes him vulnerable to my objections.  He also says that, “pointing to nothing beyond itself” 
(2007: 76, 80), the neutral pain lacks “representational … force”.  But I take his point to be only 
that the pain’s “pain quality” fails to represent (2007: 95-96).  Grahek occasionally sounds rather 
evaluativist, as where he denies that the hedomotive component is “a coldly calculated 
informational appraisal” (2007: 80; see also 82, 89, and 92). 
12 Klein 2012. 
13 See also Geschwind 1965 and Berthier et al 1988 (48). 
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avoided damage only to avoid unpleasant pain, which the case of pain 
insensitives—who don’t feel pain but still try to avoid damage—shows is 
false (Klein 2012).  Grahek might reply that Abe’s brain won’t associate 
visual threat even with damage.  He reminds us that there are neurons 
whose response rate, given visual presentations of a pin approaching the 
subject’s face, declines until the pin makes contact—as though unpleasant 
pain (which Grahek takes to be damage-representing) is required to 
“remind” the brain of the association between the visual threat and such 
damage (2007: 68).  Abe’s problem, the idea goes, is that his brain cannot 
be thus “reminded”.  Now, this explanation arguably predicts a delay that 
the literature does not report:  between the onset of Abe’s pain deficits and 
his visual deficits.  But that might be the literature’s fault, not the view’s.  
A more serious difficulty is that it leaves certain non-pain deficits 
unexplained (Klein 2012).  Why, for instance, does Abe not respond when 
told he is to be injured?  Here we might appeal to yet more associations, 
involving utterance types.  But the problem persists:  an otherwise normal 
subject should, as a matter of practical rationality, take evasive action 
when warned of damage even if his brain has “forgotten” such 
associations.  Yet Abe does not.  Indeed, he sometimes inflicts damage on 
himself.  Why?  
 So the basic hedonic account fails the scope challenge, and 
Grahek’s associationist elaborations don’t help.  For all this, I shall 
ultimately endorse an hedonic account, one that substitutes my composite 
view for Grahek’s and incorporates the care-lack hypothesis.  But why 
bother?  Why not opt for a non-hedonic, psychological story? 
 
4.  U-Tolerance:  a Non-Hedonic Psychological Account 
 
According to the non-hedonic, psychological story, recall, Abe’s pain is 
just as unpleasant as Norm’s, but he fails to react thanks to some 
psychological deficit.  One such view says the psychological deficit is an 
abnormally high tolerance of pain’s unpleasantness.  Abe, as we might put 
it, is more u-tolerant than Norm.  U-tolerance must be distinguished from 
what I call stimulus thresholds, for example the minimum stimulus 
intensities a subject will say cause pain or are intolerable.14  These 
                                                          
14 Berthier et al 1988 (42, 44). 
thresholds don’t help:  Abe and Norm categorise the same intensities as 
pain-causing; and while there is no intensity Abe will call intolerable, 
that’s our explanandum, not an explanation.  But u-tolerance is a different:  
it is the minimum degree not of stimulus intensity, but of unpleasant pain, 
that a subject will call intolerable.  And this seems more promising.  
Enjoying higher u-tolerance, Abe is simply tougher than Norm. 
 This account preserves PU more easily than Grahek’s.  And it 
seems to cohere with what some asymbolics say, for example those who 
report that noxious stimuli “hurt”,15 and the patient of Stengel’s who puts 
his own deficits down to being “used to” pain after a lifetime of labouring 
(Hemphill and Stengel 1940:  256).  But the proposal also has difficulties, 
not least how to make sense of u-tolerance in such a way as to make sense 
of Abe. 
What might it mean to say that Abe is more tolerant of pain’s 
unpleasantness than Norm?  Perhaps that he is made less anxious by a 
given degree of unpleasant pain.  If so, asymbolia resembles lobotomy for 
chronic pain in so far as lobotomy reduces neither the patient’s pain nor its 
unpleasantness, but only her anxiety about the pain and its significance 
(Price 2000).  But, while Abe is indeed less anxious than Norm, he doesn’t 
look merely less anxious.  For instance, while the lobotomised still 
withdraw and wince at novel pains caused by pinprick,16 Abe doesn’t.  
The current proposal fails to say why. 
 A second elaboration of Abe’s u-tolerance is twofold:  (i) pain’s 
unpleasantness normally motivates only because we normally want it to 
cease; (ii) Abe’s lesions prevent that desire.  But this is hard to swallow 
given the conflict between (i) and the intuition, UM, that pain’s 
unpleasantness is inherently motivating.  To see this, notice how much 
less plausible (i) is than Pitcher’s desire view.  Whereas Pitcher thinks 
subjects’ anti-pain desires make their pains motivating and unpleasant, so if 
one lacks such a desire then one’s pain is neither motivating nor 
unpleasant, (i) says that subjects’ anti-unpleasantness desires make 
independently unpleasant pains motivating, so if one lacks such a desire then 
one’s pain is not even defeasibly motivating even though it is still 
                                                          
15 Schilder and Stengel 1928.  Berthier et al 1988 says asymbolics have pain thresholds, defined 
as the minimum stimulus intensities subjects call “painful”. 
16 Melzack and Wall 1982 (131). 
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unpleasant.  Some bullets must be bitten, of course, but I shall show that 
our best account of asymbolia needn’t bite this one.  
 In parallel with metaethical internalism, UM must of course be 
reconciled with two possibilities:  a pain’s motivational force being 
defeated by stronger motivations, and a completely paralysed person 
suffering unpleasant pain (Author).  But if it is therefore suggested that 
Abe is u-tolerant simply in the sense that his pain’s motivational force is 
always defeated, we must be told what the defeating motivations are.   It 
might instead be suggested that he is u-tolerant in the sense that he is 
paralysed—not generally, of course, but in a way limited to the 
behavioural effects of unpleasant pain.  But even were we to accept this, it 
would leave two crucial things unexplained:  Abe’s non-pain deficits, and 
his denial that his pain is unpleasant. 
 That last point is crucial, for the same two problems will surely 
undermine all u-tolerance accounts, including a final primitivist version, 
which says u-tolerance consists simply in finding pain’s unpleasantness 
relatively, well, tolerable.  For even were we prepared to accept such 
primitivism, the two problems just mentioned remain.  How does 
tolerance of pain’s unpleasantness explain Abe’s unresponsiveness to 
visual and verbal threat?   And if his pain is unpleasant, why does he say 
it isn’t?  It might be said that all he means is that his pain, while 
unpleasant, is tolerable.  But I shall show we can do better than that. 
  
5.  Klein’s Non-Hedonic Psychological Account 
 
Colin Klein has recently proposed another non-hedonic, psychological 
approach.17  Crucially, it promises to do what both u-tolerance and 
Grahek’s hedonic approach failed to do:  namely, explain Abe’s non-pain 
deficits.  For the psychological abnormality Klein attributes to Abe is not 
u-tolerance, but an inability to care about his own body; and this explains 
Abe’s non-pain deficits nicely.  Why is Abe unresponsive to visual and 
verbal threats of bodily harm?  Why does he seem worse than pain 
insensitives at learning which situations might harm him?  Why does he 
sometimes harm himself?  Because, Klein says, there is a basic kind of care 
                                                          
17 In correspondence, Klein accepts that his is a non-hedonic account. 
for one’s own bodily integrity that Abe—thanks to his brain damage—
lacks.  
 But Klein’s view faces three serious difficulties.  The first two are 
faced by all non-hedonic accounts, and are familiar from our discussion of 
u-tolerance.  First, if Abe’s pain is unpleasant, why does he fail to grimace 
and say that it isn’t?  Klein might wiggle and say that Abe only means 
that, while unpleasant, his pain doesn’t motivate damage-limitation 
behaviour.  But not only is that a stretch, it leaves his failure to grimace 
unexplained. 
 Second, Klein arguably struggles to accommodate UM, the idea 
that pain’s unpleasantness is inherently motivating.  Klein claims, on the 
contrary, that his care-lack view accommodates pain’s motivational force 
better than hedonic views.  For he thinks the reason Abe’s unpleasant pain 
fails to motivate him is not that his pain is defective, but that he is.  Just as a 
struck match might have the power to light yet not do so if oxygen is 
absent, so Abe’s pain has everything it needs to motivate—defeasibly and 
absent physical impediments—but fails to do so only because Abe fails to 
care, care being an enabling condition on the pain’s motivational power.  
But I still insist that hedonic views better accommodate pain’s 
motivational force.  Yes, they say Abe’s pain is missing something, but 
that doesn’t violate our intuitions about pains’ motivational force, since what 
they are missing is precisely what intuitively makes pains motivational:  
namely, their unpleasantness.  To put it another way, if hedonic views 
violate an intuition, it is PU, not UM.  It remains the case, moreover, that 
Klein imposes an enabling condition on an unpleasant pain’s motivating 
its subject that my hedonic view does not:  that the subject care about his 
bodily integrity.  For I shall argue that such care is a condition not on 
unpleasant pain motivating, but on a pain’s being unpleasant. 
Third, and most important, while Klein explains the non-pain 
deficits, he does so at the cost of failing to explain the pain deficits.  I have 
already mentioned two such deficits:  Abe’s denial of his pain’s 
unpleasantness and his failure to grimace.  But the problem is more 
general.  Why does Abe not withdraw when caused pain?  Why, when in 
pain, does he not exhibit anger or anxiety?  The official answer is that Abe 
is incapable of caring about his bodily integrity.  But that just postpones 
the problem, for why should lack of care matter?  Why should care be an 
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enabling condition on the motivational force of one’s pain?  Call that the 
relevance question.  And notice it won’t do to reply that Abe of course 
won’t be motivated by his pains if he doesn’t care about them.  For the 
care-lack view is that Abe cannot care about his body, not about his pains.  
In a sense, it is true, he doesn’t care about his pains; but that is our 
explanandum, not an explanation.  So the relevance question remains. 
 We might hope an answer would come from Klein’s imperativist 
view of the nature of pain’s motivational character: 
 
Klein’s unitary imperativism 
Being in unpleasant pain consists in undergoing an 
experience with a non-indicative, imperative content, in 
virtue of which the experience commands one to stop 
doing what one is doing. 
 
On this view, unpleasant pains are unitary, not composite, and they 
motivate in virtue of their imperative content.  One is motivated to stop 
putting weight on one’s sprained ankle because one’s pain tells one to.  
Does this answer the relevance question?  I think not.  Suppose, as Klein 
does, that imperative contents are normally motivating.  It is quite unclear 
why Abe’s not caring about his body should make them any less so.  Klein 
might say that their content is not purely imperative:  not “Stop putting 
weight on your ankle!”, but “Stop putting weight on your ankle or else it 
will get damaged!”.  But that will help only given the following idea:  while 
the italicised, indicative warning of bodily damage normally motivates, it 
fails to do so in Abe’s case because of care-lack.  Yet that would 
undermine Klein’s imperativism, for imperativism’s central idea is that, 
since indicative content is motivationally inert, pains must have 
imperative content.  So an imperativist better not rest the care-lack 
explanation on the motivational power of indicative rather than 
imperative contents.  
 
6.  An Hedonic and Psychological Account 
 
Despite the difficulties besetting Klein’s care-lack account, I don’t want to 
jettison his idea that Abe lacks care, given its explanatory promise.  It 
alone looks capable of explaining Abe’s non-pain deficits.  And Klein 
makes a persuasive case that it also dovetails with prevailing conceptions 
of the role of the insula, as well as illuminating intriguing similarities 
between the pain reactions of asymbolics, on the one hand, and those of 
schizophrenics, the depersonalised, and morphine patients, on the other 
(Klein 2012).  But can the care-lack idea be elaborated in a way that avoids 
my objections? 
I think it can, provided we do two things: 
  
A.  Reject Klein’s unitary imperativism for a composite 
view, distinguishing neutral pains and hedomotive 
components.  
 
B.  Reject Klein’s idea that care-lack disables unpleasant 
pain’s motivational force, and claim instead that care-
lack prevents pain’s unpleasantness altogether.  Hold, in 
other words, that care is an existence condition on pain’s 
unpleasantness, not an enabling condition on its 
motivational force. 
 
Most conceptions of pain’s unpleasantness, I’ll presently argue, block B.  
But if the obstacles can somehow be avoided, the prize will be a view that 
is both psychological and hedonic, a view on which Abe’s pain lacks 
unpleasantness because he lacks care—again, on which his pain is 
abnormal because he is.  This preserves the strengths of Klein’s account 
without the weaknesses.  It preserves his explanation of Abe’s non-pain 
deficits in terms of care-lack.  And, taking care-lack to prevent—not merely 
disable—Abe’s pain’s unpleasantness, it also does what Klein couldn’t do:  
explain Abe’s pain deficits, for example his failure to withdraw, his failure 
to grimace or get angry, and his denial that his pain is unpleasant.  It does 
so, moreover, while straightforwardly capturing UM.  For we need not 
impose Klein’s enabling condition on unpleasant pains motivating if we 
can instead say that the reason Abe’s pain fails to motivate is that it is not 
unpleasant. 
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 So the prize is attractive.  But the relevance question remains, 
albeit in a new guise:  why should a lack of bodily care prevent pain’s 
unpleasantness? 
As a unitary imperativist, Klein has no answer.  But what about 
composite imperativists, such as Richard Hall and Manolo Martínez, who 
hold that unpleasant pain’s content comprises a neutral, indicative 
component, and an hedomotive, imperative component (Hall 2008; 
Martínez 2011)?  Applying this to Abe, in line with A and B, the idea 
would be that Abe’s not caring about his bodily integrity prevents pain’s 
imperative content.  But the question remains:  why should it do that?  
Imperativists have no answer.  Hence imperativism, I suggest, has now 
been shown to be incapable of capitalising on the care-lack hypothesis 
whether it is elaborated in Klein’s way or in mine. 
 Pitcher’s desire view also doesn’t help.  Pitcher thinks that an 
unpleasant pain’s hedomotive component is a desire for the pain to cease.  
Applying this to Abe, in line with A and B, the idea would be that Abe’s 
care-lack prevents this desire.  But why should it?  Why should Abe’s not 
caring about his body prevent him from wanting his pain—an experience—
to cease? 
 Grahek’s composite account doesn’t help either.  He thinks that 
pain’s hedomotive component consists in a layer of damage-representing 
content.18  Applying this to Abe, in line with A and B, the idea would be 
that Abe’s care-lack prevents the damage-representing content.  But why 
should it?  You might not care about an orchid and yet believe that the dry 
weather is damaging it; so too Abe might fail to care about his own body 
yet still have an experience representing it as damaged.  Care, in short, 
doesn’t look like an existence condition even on experiential damage-
representations.  The Grahekian might instead say that it is an enabling 
condition, that Abe’s care-lack doesn’t prevent but merely disables his 
pain experience’s damage-representing content, hence its unpleasantness.  
But that would make the care-lack account a non-hedonic view, hence 
vulnerable to  objections I made in §§4-5:  namely, that it cannot explain 
why Abe denies his pain is unpleasant and fails to grimace; and that it 
distances pain’s unpleasantness from motivation.   
There is a better way.  What is needed to capitalise on A and B is 
the composite view I introduced at the outset.  For evaluativism answers 
the relevance question.  Why should pain’s hedomotive component rely 
on the subject’s caring about his bodily integrity?  Because, I suggest, 
unpleasant pain’s hedomotive component consists in an evaluative layer 
of content by dint of which it represents states of damage as bad; and it 
will present those states in that way only to a subject who cares about his 
body.  This, I suggest, is highly plausible.  I concede—indeed I insist—that 
bodily states could strike Abe as damaging even while he fails to care about 
his body.  But, if he doesn’t care about his body, they won’t strike him as 
bad, hence won’t be unpleasant, hence won’t motivate avoidance 
behaviour.  Evaluativism, I suggest, thus answers the relevance question.19 
 Unpleasant pains are not the only evaluations that depend on a 
given kind of care.  Consider fear.  Though you and I both watch a rock 
                                                          
18 If unpleasantness instead consists in non-representational qualia, as Grahek sometimes seems 
to think (see note 11 above), the relevance question would be even harder to answer. 
19 The point is not that “pain’s unpleasantness = pain’s possession of the right evaluative 
content” holds only for those who care, but that pains will have that content, hence be 
unpleasant, only in those who care. 
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falling towards a vase, it might be that only you fear it because only you 
care about the vase.20  Why might care make this difference?  Because, I 
suggest, fear too is evaluative, representing the danger that x poses to y as 
bad, and one’s experientially representing the danger posed to y as bad 
requires one to care about y.  Hence this contrast between you and me in 
the fear case is much like the contrast I am drawing between Norm and 
Abe in the pain case:  they both have pain experiences representing their 
bodies as damaged, but only Norm cares about his body, hence only his 
pain represents the damage as bad, hence only his pain is unpleasant and 
motivating. 
 So whereas Klein claims that Norm differs from Abe in caring 
about his body, I am insisting on a further difference.  The difference is not 
doxastic.  It is not that only Norm believes his body to be in a bad state.  
Apart from anything else, Norm might lack that belief if he were an 
allodyniac, susceptible to unpleasant pains caused by innocuous touch.  
The difference on which I am insisting is rather a difference in perceptual 
content.  Only Norm’s pains represent his body as being in a bad state—
which, notice, doesn’t require him to believe that it is.  This difference, 
moreover, determines an hedonic and phenomenal difference.  Things feel 
different to Abe and Norm:  Norm’s pain is unpleasant, Abe’s is not.  That 
is why Abe denies it is unpleasant and fails to grimace, and why his pain 
doesn’t motivate avoidance behaviour.  Thus the pain deficits are 
explained.  But, crucially, I also hold that what underlies this difference in 
perceptual content is a difference in bodily care, which difference—just as 
Klein says—also explains Abe’s non-pain deficits.  Hence the scope 
challenge is met at last.  And it is met while respecting UM, since on this 
account care is a condition not on unpleasantness motivating, but on a 
pain being unpleasant. 
 
7.  Objections 
 
In closing, I briefly consider six objections. 
 
                                                          
20 The example is Helm’s (2002).  He takes a similar view of pain to mine but ignores pain 
asymbolia and seems to resist the idea that unpleasant pain has the composite structure I think 
is essential to explaining it. 
Objection 1.   Why is preserving UM but violating PU (as my account 
does) more attractive than preserving PU but violating UM (as Klein’s 
does)? 
 
Although I’ve said that Abe has a pain that is not unpleasant, my account 
could be reformulated so as to pay lip service to PU.  Although I haven’t, 
we might take the term “pain” to apply not to an unpleasant pain’s neutral 
component, but only to the whole composite, and still take Abe’s pain 
reports seriously by claiming he undergoes a neutral experience which (i) 
would have counted as a pain had it been accompanied by the usual 
hedomotive component, and (ii) is sufficiently distinctive of paradigmatic 
cases of pain to explain (if not vindicate) his pain report.  To this extent, I 
can accommodate not only UM, but PU.   
 Some might take UM to be refuted by other counterexamples, 
hence deny that accommodating it is a virtue.21  But the putative 
counterexamples are far from conclusive.  While the lobotomised say pain 
doesn’t bother them, for instance, arguably they mean only that it doesn’t 
make them anxious; and while masochists seem to seek pain, arguably 
their pain is either not unpleasant or its motivational force is present but 
defeated by stronger motivations, perhaps for humiliation.  Moreover, and 
more important, I have anyway shown that my view has much more than 
UM to recommend it. 
 
Objection 2.  Even while indifferent about Beth’s bodily integrity, Anne 
might believe that damage to Beth’s body is bad.  Evaluative content is not 
care-dependent.22 
 
I concede that Anne might believe that a state of Beth’s body is bad in 
various senses, for example that the state is one of damage, impeding the 
body’s proper functioning; that the damage is severe; and that it is 
                                                          
21 For more on UM (and PU) see Author.  Note too that Corns (forthcoming) argues that 
“hedonic tone” and “aversive valence” doubly dissociate.  But (i) the bearing of her argument 
on UM is debatable given she takes  even unconscious states to have “hedonic tone”; (ii) UM 
allows anti-damage motivations to dissociate from unpleasant pains; and (iii) Corns concedes 
that examples of dissociation in the opposite direction are inconclusive. 
22 If we retreat to the idea that care is an enabling condition on such content’s motivational force, 
we end up with a non-hedonic view, which faces now-familiar objections.  
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contrary to Beth’s interests.  But such beliefs are not what evaluativism 
invokes to explain pain’s unpleasantness.  Evaluativism invokes episodes 
in which badness in another, fully normative sense is represented 
experientially, episodes in which the subject is struck that certain bodily 
states are, as we might put it, to-be-avoided.23  It is these episodes that care-
lack seems to prevent. 
Setting my proposal in context, I earlier mentioned fear.  But 
desire is another instructive case.  Just as I have elsewhere argued for 
evaluativism on the basis that unpleasant pains can be motivating 
reasons—episodes that motivate behaviour in such a way as to allow 
sense to be made of it in terms of the reasons for which an agent performed 
it—only by dint of their being evaluative experiences, in which subjects 
are struck by the badness of their bodily states (Author), so others have 
similarly argued that desires can be motivating reasons only by dint of their 
being evaluative experiences, in which subjects are struck by the goodness 
of what is desired (Stampe 1987; Helm 2002; Oddie 2005).  And some of 
these theorists’ examples support the claim I am making here:  that such 
evaluative experiences are care-dependent.  Dennis Stampe, for instance, 
remarks that one might judge that something (e.g. the end of a war) would 
be good without being even defeasibly moved to bring it about, if one did 
not care sufficiently to “arouse” a desire for that thing—again, as Stampe 
also puts it, if one did not care sufficiently to produce “a perceptual state 
in which that thing seems good” (1987: 358-359).  It is in much the same 
way, I am claiming, that Abe’s care-lack prevents his pain experience from 
representing his bodily state as (in the relevant sense) bad.24  
 A full defence of evaluativism would need to speak to the 
metaphysics of badness.  There are a range of options, from realism to 
eliminativism.   But all I need here is that bodily states can perceptually 
seem bad in the relevant sense.  I don’t have a psychosemantics to prove 
they can; but nor do I see a compelling reason to insist they cannot.25   
 
                                                          
23 See Oddie 2005 (42) and Helm 2003 (21).  
24 Helm similarly thinks that differences in “background concern … for one’s [own] safety and 
integrity” can explain differences between pleasant and painful experiences (2002: 16-17, 22-23). 
25 Cutter and Tye (2011) provide a “tracking” psychosemantics, but arguably identify damage 
and badness.  For gestures at other accounts, see Helm on pain (2002: 23) and Stampe on desire 
(1987: 364-374).     
Objection 3.  Others who lack care (e.g. the lobotomised, the suicidal, and 
those who hate their bodies) nonetheless have unpleasant, motivating 
pains.  So either evaluative content is not care-dependent or evaluativism 
is false. 
 
In reply, I deny that the suicidal or those who hate their bodies lack care.  
To commit suicide is to override care for your body, not to lack it.  Nor 
does hating how your body looks, or even being disgusted by it, involve 
lacking care for it.  As for the lobotomised, one option is to say that their 
pains are not unpleasant and motivating.  I earlier denied this (§4) but 
there remains another option:  that the lobotomised’s lack of anxiety about 
their chronic pain reflects something other than a lack of care for their 
bodily integrity.  And, given how much else the lobotomised are relaxed 
about, that option seems plausible. 
 
Objection 4.  If it is by dint of their evaluative content that pains are 
unpleasant and motivating, the same must be true of thirst sensations.  Yet 
Abe has thirst sensations that motivate him to drink (Schilder and Stengel 
1928:  150).  So either evaluative content is not care-dependent or 
evaluativism is false. 
 
The worry is that the care-lack hypothesis fails the scope challenge not by 
being too narrow (omitting some deficits) but by being too broad 
(predicting deficits Abe lacks).26  But there are three replies.  First, we 
might resist extending evaluativism beyond pain to thirst.  Second, we 
might demand more evidence before conceding the problematic datum:  
not that Abe drinks, but that he is driven to do so in the normal way by 
hedonic thirst sensations.  Finally, we might distinguish kinds of bodily 
care.  Abe, the idea would go, lacks the kind that underlies the 
hedomotive component of pain, but not the kind that underlies the 
hedomotive component of thirst.  The former, perhaps, is care that one’s 
body not be damaged (call this d-care), the latter is care that that its needs 
are met (n-care).  Normal subjects, of course, both d-care and n-care, and 
                                                          
26 A similar worry:  if Abe doesn’t care about his body, he should be more susceptible to injury 
than Norm.  Reply:   asymbolics are more injury-prone, so long as their asymbolia (which is not 
always permanent) lasts.  See  Berthier et al 1988 (42-43, 44). 
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they n-care partly because they d-care, since unmet needs cause damage.  
But, the idea goes, Abe is brain damaged; and he is brain damaged in such 
a way as to prevent d-care but not n-care, thus preventing the hedomotive 
component only of his pain, not of his thirst.27 
 
Objection 5.   D-caring is merely a matter of being motivated to avoid 
bodily damage.  So the care-lack account amounts to the triviality that Abe 
is unmotivated to avoid bodily damage because he is unmotivated to 
avoid bodily damage. 
 
But my version of the care-lack explanation of Abe comes to more than 
that.  Norm’s d-care is not merely a matter of his being inclined to avoid 
bodily damage.  Rather, I suggest, it is a standing, non-episodic state, one 
that is non-conceptual yet itself evaluative.28  And, crucially, while this 
care state explains Norm’s being motivated to avoid bodily damage, that 
is not all it explains.  I have insisted it also explains his pain’s 
unpleasantness, and thereby his grimacing and his resenting those who 
gratuitously cause him pain.  So, I suggest, another advantage of meeting 
the scope challenge is that it heads off the threat of triviality. 
 
Objection 6. Two final worries, about care and desire:  (i) Care for one’s 
bodily integrity entails a desire to avoid bodily damage; but unpleasant 
pain surely doesn’t, since one can feel unpleasant pain without possessing 
concepts and while willingly sustaining bodily damage.  (ii) If Abe doesn’t 
care about his body, he lacks such an anti-damage desire, and that lack 
suffices to explain his failure to withdraw from noxious stimuli all by 
itself, rendering my appeal to a missing layer of evaluative content otiose. 
 
To begin with (i), this much is true:  I claim that care is required for 
damage to produce certain motivational episodes in a subject, namely 
unpleasant pains.  But I am not committed to such care entailing anti-
                                                          
27 It might be felt that this is ad hoc, but there are independent reasons to distinguish kinds of 
care.  
28 See Helm 2002 on care as a standing evaluation.  Regarding care’s non-conceptuality, another 
option is to say it is conceptual but invoke some non-conceptual “proto-care” that plays a 
similar role in beings without concepts.  Note that care is also not merely a disposition to have 
unpleasant pains when damaged. 
damage desires in any more demanding sense of “desire”.  Moreover, 
such anti-damage motivation as unpleasant pains entail is defeasible:  it 
might be defeated by another motivation (e.g. to save one’s family from 
the flames), driving one not to minimise damage. 
Turning to (ii), the objector’s idea is that we might locate the 
difference between Abe and Norm in Norm’s anti-damage desires.  But 
this poses a crucial question.  Does this desiderative difference make for a 
hedonic, phenomenal difference?  Suppose the objector says it does not.  
In that case, hers is a non-hedonic view, hence vulnerable to now-familiar 
objections:  it distances pain’s unpleasantness from motivation, since it 
says that, while Abe’s pain is unpleasant like Norm’s, it fails to motivate 
because of his missing desire; and it leaves unexplained why, if Abe’s pain 
is unpleasant, he fails to grimace and says that it is not.  In short, the 
difference between Abe and Norm looks hedonic and phenomenal, not 
merely desiderative. 
 Now suppose that the objector claims her proposed desiderative 
difference does constitute an hedonic, phenomenal difference.  In that case, 
the view is not obviously a rival to mine.  For my view too says that some 
care-dependent accompaniment of Norm’s pain renders his pain 
motivating and unpleasant, and my view too takes that accompaniment to 
be an anti-damage motivation.  The contrast between the views is only 
that I characterise the motivation as an experiential representation of the 
badness of a state of damage, whereas the putative objector characterises it 
as a desire for the damage to cease.  But it is unclear what hangs on this 
difference.  Indeed, on the evaluative view of desire mentioned above, the 
experience I am invoking is a desire—a felt, unpleasant desire—that the 
damage cease.  I do not object to my evaluativism being put that way (see 
Author).29  
 
  
 
                                                          
29 (i) Notice the desires in question are anti-damage, not (like those Pitcher invokes) anti-pain.  
(ii) I have argued elsewhere that taking unpleasant pains to involve desires without evaluative 
content fails to accommodate their rationalising role (Author). 
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In conclusion, I have defended a view on which Abe’s pain is abnormal (as 
per the hedonic story) because he is abnormal (as per the non-hedonic 
story):  it lacks a hedomotive component because he lacks care.  
Incorporated into an hedonic account, care-lack promises to explain not 
only Abe’s failure to withdraw from visual and verbal threat, but his 
denial that his pain is unpleasant, and his failure to grimace, get angry, or 
withdraw from pain-causing stimuli; and it promises to explain this while 
respecting a tight link between pain’s unpleasantness and motivation.  To 
realise this promise, we need to connect care and pain’s hedomotive 
component, and this require evaluativism.  So, if evaluativism is 
defensible, it has a surprising virtue:  being indispensable to our most 
promising account of asymbolia.  In short, asymbolia suggests the 
following:  contra Klein, that unpleasant pain has a composite structure; 
and contra Klein, Grahek, and Pitcher, that the structure’s hedomotive 
component is evaluative.  
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